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News broke during the last week of September 2008 that the
Department of Homeland Security has begun testing a new mind-reading
device.1 According to the Department’s website, the Human Factors
Directorate of Science and Technology has been working on Future
Attribute Screening Technology (FAST).2 Homeland Security defines
FAST as
∗ Associate Dean for Faculty Research & Development and Professor of Law, Florida International
College of Law. With gratitude to Professor Jane Moriarty for her invitation to this symposium and
with love to Ken, Adam, and Nathan.
1. Thomas Frank, Anxiety Detecting Machines Could Spot Terrorists, USA TODAY, Sept. 18,
2008; Allison Barrie, Homeland Security Detects Terrorist Threats by Reading Your Mind, Fox
News.com, Sept. 23, 2008 http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,426485,00.html.
2. Dept. of Homeland Security: Science and Technology Directorate Human Factors
Behavioral Sciences Division. http://www.dhs.gov/xres/programs/gc_1218480185439.shtm#9 (last
visited Feb. 23, 2009).
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an initiative to develop innovative, non-invasive technologies to screen
people at security checkpoints. FAST is grounded in research on
human behavior and psychophysiology, focusing on new advances in
behavioral/human-centered screening techniques. The aim is a
prototypical mobile suite (FAST M2) that would be used to increase
the accuracy and validity of identifying persons with malintent (the
intent or desire to cause harm).3

Although design specifics have not been made public, the MALINTENT
prototype is a device that rapidly and remotely measures subjects’ body
temperature, heart rate, and respiration.4 MALINTENT then compares
these measurements with a matrix of physiological norms to generate
conclusions about each subject’s future dangerousness. MALINTENT’s
designers and proponents believe that this new technology will reliably
distinguish perspiring perambulators and fearful flyers from true
terrorists.5 These claims are difficult to assess because the results of the
only publically disclosed tests of MALINTENT were subsequently
classified.6
The creation of the MALINTENT prototype signals that we are fast
approaching a future of increased reliance on technologically
sophisticated devices that purport to reveal cognition and predict
behavior. These and other new “mind-reading” machines will have a
profound impact on society and law. Those worried about the risks of
these new devices will likely find cold comfort in the assurances of
Homeland Security Department project leader Bob Burns that fullyoperational MALINTENT-screened security checkpoints will “restore a
sense of freedom” to America.7
I learned about MALINTENT shortly after I had returned from the
University of Akron School of Law symposium on Neuroscience, Law
and Government. On a lovely fall day in late September 2008, Professor
Jane Moriarty assembled an impressive group of legal scholars, judges,
and scientists and asked them to embark on a far-ranging discussion of
the potential points of intersection between neuroscience and law (a field
sometimes referred to in the popular press – although not once at this

3. Thomas Frank, Anxiety Detecting Machines Could Spot Terrorists, USA TODAY, Sept. 18,
2008; Allison Barrie, Homeland Security Detects Terrorist Threats by Reading Your Mind, Fox
News.com, Sept. 23, 2008 http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,426485,00.html.
4. Barrie, supra note 1.
5. Barrie, supra note 1 (“If you’re rushed or stressed, you may send out signals of anxiety,
but FAST isn’t fooled. It’s already good enough to tell the difference between a harried traveler and
a terrorist. Even if you sweat heavily by nature, FAST won’t mistake you for a baddie.”).
6. Id.
7. Barrie, supra note 1.

http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol42/iss3/3

2

Moreno: The Future of Neuroimaged Lie Detection and the Law

8-MORENO_COPYFORPRINTER.DOC

2009]

THE FUTURE OF NEUROIMAGED LIE DETECTION AND THE LAW

5/26/2009 10:28 AM

719

symposium – as “neurolaw”).8
We did not know about the
MALINTENT prototype when we met in Akron, but many of us focused
on current and future efforts to measure and correlate peripheral nervous
system responses with cognition.
New technologies designed for “mind-reading” are our future.
They will likely include both cost-effective remote MALINTENT-style
dangerousness detectors (for use outside the courtroom) and new efforts
to map the neural correlates of deception and social behavior (for use
outside and inside the courtroom). In the very near future, legal
scholars, judges, and practitioners will need to decide when law and
society can legitimately rely on cognitive neuroscience and other forms
of “mind-reading” research. Under the circumstances, I was delighted
that Professor Moriarty invited me to join this discussion and contribute
this Article to the Akron Law Review.
Although neuroscience and neuroimaging technologies are in a
dynamic state of rapid improvement, I will begin with a few basics.
Neuroscience is the study of the brain and nervous system. The three
neuroimaging technologies/modalities most frequently used to measure
brain activity are: functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI),
electroencephalography (EEG), and positron emission tomography
(PET).9 fMRI uses an MRI scanner to measure active brain blood flow,
EEG uses electrodes attached to the scalp to measure electrical activity,
and PET measures the absorption of small amounts of radioactive
materials introduced into the subject’s body. All three neuroimaging
technologies were developed for medical diagnostic purposes and
continue to be used for these purposes.10 For example, fMRI images are
frequently used for neurosurgical planning, EEGs for the evaluation of

8. See The University of Akron: Neuroscience, Law and Government Symposium – Program
Videos [hereinafter, Neuroscience Symposium], http://www.uakron.edu/law/neurosymposium.php
(last visited Feb. 22, 2009).
9. An important distinction between fMRI and EEG is that fMRI provides a more precise
image of the location of neural activity than EEG, but is an inferior measure of neural change
because fMRI images are generally taken every two seconds and EEGs use a millisecond scale to
measure electrical impulses. See Robin Marantz Henig, Looking for the Lie, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 5,
2006. During his presentation, Dr. Daniel Langleben also described a recent series of Japanese PET
scan studies. See Neuroscience Symposium, http://www.uakron.edu/law/neuroscience/panel1.php.
He noted that despite the superior quality of the images generated by PET scan, these studies would
not be replicated by any U.S. researchers because PET scans involve a high level of radiation and
some amount of pain (due to the placement of an intravenous line). Id.
10. Eric Racine, et al., fMRI in the Public Eye, 6 NAT. REV. NEUROSCIENCE 159, 159 (2005)
(describing how fMRI and PET have “evolved as key research approaches to studying both disease
processes and the basic physiology of cognitive phenomena in contemporary neuroscience”).
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seizures, and PET scans to monitor the progress of cancer treatment.11
The field of cognitive neuroscience barely existed ten years ago;12 but
neuroscientists have become increasingly interested in exploring the
possibility that these same neuroimaging technologies can accurately
correlate brain activity with cognition.
Even more recently, cognitive neuroscience, “neuroethics,” and
even “neuropolitics” and “neuromarketing” have gone mainstream.13
Neuroethics, a term commonly credited to the New York Times
columnist William Safire,14 is generally used to describe the
constellation of normative and social issues implicated by decisions on
how society should use neuroscientific data.
I am writing this Article at the tail end of a prolonged and fractious
election cycle. Thus, it is also worth nothing that the 2008 presidential
election marked the birth of a new field of neuroethics that might be
called “neuropolitics.” For example, just one week before the election,
the New York Times published an op-ed by neuroscientists from
Princeton and the University of Pennsylvania asserting that
[r]ecent research in neuroscience and psychology . . . suggests that
most undecided voters may be smarter than you think. They’re not
indifferent or unable to make clear comparisons between the
candidates. They may be more willing than others to take their time —
or else just unaware that they have essentially already made a choice.15

These authors make relatively modest claims.16 However, an earlier
N.Y.U. neuropolitics study concluded that brain scans of subjects who
identified themselves as “liberal” demonstrate more anterior cingulate
11. See Columbia University Medical Center: Program for Imaging and Cognitive Sciences,
The Future Role of functional MRI in Medical Applications, http://www.fmri.org/fmri.htm
(describing the potential uses of fMRI technology in neurosurgical planning); Lee, Sang-Ahm, et
al., Intracranial EEG Seizure-Onset Patterns in Neocortical Epilepsy, 41(3) EPILEPSIA 297 (2000)
(reporting the results of a study using EEGs to analyze the onset of epileptic seizures), available at
http://www3.interscience.wiley.com/cgi-bin/fulltext/119003501/PDFSTART); Specter Says His
Cancer has Returned, WASH. POST, Apr. 16, 2008, at A05 (routine PET scan revealed that
Pennsylvania Senator Arlen Specter’s cancer had returned).
12. Edward Vul et al, Puzzlingly High Correlations in fMRI Studies of Emotion, Personality,
and Social Cognition, PERSPECTIVES ON PHYSIOLOGICAL SCIENCE (forthcoming May 2009) (noting
that efforts to correlate social behavior to brain activity began approximately ten years ago).
13. Racine, supra note 10 at abstract (noting that the wide dissemination of cognitive
neuroscience research has “not escaped the attention of the neuroscience and neuroethics
communities, the media or the broader public”).
14. A September 28, 2008 search of the New York Times website reveals that the term
“neuroethics” first appeared in a May 16, 2002 Safire column entitled The But-What-If Factor.
William Safire, The But-What-if Factor, N.Y. TIMES, May 16, 2002.
15. Sam Wang & Joshua Gold, Your Brain’s Secret Ballot, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 28, 2008.
16. Id.
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cortex activity than those who identified themselves as “conservative.”
According to the N.Y.U. psychologists, enhanced brain activity among
the liberal cohort correlates with a heightened sensitivity to the need for
change.17 A third widely-read (and widely-criticized) neuropolitics
study from U.C.L.A. reported that brain scans of subjects who were
shown pictures of presidential candidates or the words “Democrat,”
“Republican,” and “Independent” revealed neural activity that correlated
with emotions that included disgust, anxiety, ambivalence, and
empathy.18 With the election just days away and the holiday season fast
approaching, this neuropolitics research was replaced in the mainstream
media with even more recent “neuromarketing” efforts to use EEGs to
gauge shoppers’ purchasing preferences.19
All of this neuroscience in the news suggests that if we want to
predict or control future social and legal responses to cognitive
neuroscience research, we must carefully consider two basic preexisting
realities: (1) our shared assumptions about the validity of the medical
field of neuroscience and the accuracy of diagnostic neuroimaging
technologies; and (2) our increasingly frequent exposure (even within
the mainstream media) to uncritical reports of cognitive neuroscience
research that purports to correlate brain activity with cognition,
deception, or social behavior. In general, judges, jurors, and the general
public will likely view neuroscience-based evidence as legitimate “hard”
science because researchers rely on technologically sophisticated
neuroimaging tools of demonstrated accuracy. Thus, neuroscience
research is less likely to face the inherent skepticism reserved (often
appropriately) for the “soft” sciences, the forensic science, or other fields
of inquiry developed solely or primarily for litigation purposes.
More specifically, the advent of nascent fields such as
“neuropolitics” and “neuromarketing,” reveal the growing public
appetite for cognitive neuroscience research. We like to know how we

17. Nikhil Swaminathan, Are We Predisposed to Political Beliefs?, SCI. AM., Sept. 10, 2007,
http://www.sciam.com/article.cfm?id=are-we-predisposed-to-political-beliefs.
18. Marco Iacoboni et al., This is Your Brain on Politics, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 11, 2007.
However, this study was severely criticized by others in the field, including neuropsychologist
Martha Farah, whose response to the Iacoboni study included the following comments:
So why do I doubt the conclusions reported in today’s Op Ed piece? The problems I see
have less to do with brain imaging per se than with the human tendency to make up “just
so” stories and then believe them. The scattered spots of activation in a brain image can
be like tea leaves in the bottom of a cup – ambiguous and accommodating of a large
number of possible interpretations.
http://www.mindhacks.com/blog/2007/11/election_brain_scan_.html.
19. Tim Harford, Money on the Brain: What Can “Neuroeconomics” Teach Us About How
We Shop?, Slate.com, Nov. 1, 2008, available at http://www.slate.com/id/2203159/.
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think and the expanding number of neuro-fields, reveals an intense
public interest in research that purports to use “brain scans” to explain
psychological phenomena.20
Thus, future social and legal responses to cognitive neuroscience
will be shaped by both our familiarity and our desires. Because these
two preexisting conditions have received relatively little attention from
legal scholars anxious to be the first to map a brave new world of
accurately neuroimaged cognition, they will be the focus of this Article.
I. HOW SHOULD LAW PREPARE TO RESPOND TO COGNITIVE
NEUROSCIENCE?
A. The Potential Influence of Cognitive Neuroscience on Law
Neuroscience will certainly change law. In fact, neuroscience
research has the potential to influence a vast range of legal decisions. To
the extent that neuroscientists increasingly make claims that
neuroimaging reveals cognition, even the most unimaginative
prognosticator might predict: (1) the preliminary investigative use of
neuroimages to enhance witness interviews and police interrogations
(including but not limited to lie-detection), (2) jury selection based on
neuroimages that appear to reveal jurors’ unconscious stereotypes or
biases, and (3) arguments about intent or sentencing based on
neuroimage-enhanced explanations of behavior and predictions of
dangerousness.
Professor Hank Greely has cautioned that generating (even
accurate) predictions about the many ways that neuroscience might
impact law is an inadequate conceptual construct.21 In addition to the
obvious concern that neuroscience data be demonstrably valid, Professor
Greely suggests that the legal system must also consider the potential
consequences of grounding legal decisions in neuroscientific findings
including questions of fairness (when neuroscience purports to predict
20. See David P. McCabe & Alan Castel, Seeing is Believing: The Effect of Brain Images on
Judgments of Scientific Reasoning, 107 COGNITION 343, 349-351 (2008) (concluding that the
inclusion of brain images enhanced the perceived credibility of cognitive neuroscience research),
Deena Skolnick Weisberg, et al., The Seductive Allure of Neuroscience Explanations, 20 J. COG.
NEUROSCIENCE 470 (2008) (concluding that reference to (even irrelevant) neuroscience information
interferes with subjects’ ability to accurately gauge the quality of explanations of psychological
explanation).
21. Henry T. Greely, THE SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES OF ADVANCES IN NEUROSCIENCE: LEGAL
PROBLEMS, LEGAL PERSPECTIVES in NEUROETHICS: DEFINING THE ISSUES IN THEORY,
PRACTICE AND POLICY, 247-48 (Oxford University Press 2005) (describing the many relevant
factors that the legal system must consider to respond to neuroscience data).
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behavior) and efficacy (when we seek to impose barriers and limitations
on the use of neuroscience both outside and inside the courts).22 These
concerns are implicated by anticipated legal and extralegal reliance on
current and future cognitive neuroscience research.
B. Neuroimages in Court
Neuroscience evidence is often admitted in court. In fact, MRIs are
routinely admitted even when they are relevant to behavior. For
example, last summer in a criminal case that attracted national media
attention, a Manhattan jury viewed MRI brain scans of local celebrity
defendant Peter Braustein.23 Braustein, a well-known former journalist,
was charged with the kidnapping, sexual abuse, and robbery of a former
colleague. The jury viewed Braustein’s MRI scans and heard defense
arguments linking Braustein’s schizophrenia to his inability to control
his violent impulses.24 This jury presumably considered the possibility
that brain scans might provide reasonable doubt that Braustein had
formulated the requisite intent to harm this victim. However, they were
not convinced and the defendant was convicted on all counts.25 The
Braustein case, because it involved MRI evidence to explain the
defendant’s actions, is representative of the type of behavior-related
neuroscience evidence that is increasingly likely to be proffered and
admitted in both criminal and civil trials.
C. Cognitive Neuroscience Evidence in Court
Cognitive neuroscience has yet to enter U.S. courts. 26 However, in
June 2008, in a courtroom in Pune, India, evidence derived from a Brain
Electrical Oscillations Signature (“BEOS”) test was admitted during the
murder trial of Aditi Sharma.27 During pre-trial police interrogation of

22. Id.
23. David B. Caruso, Experts Study Neuroscience Use in Courts, WASH. POST, Mar. 2, 2008.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. However, in September the International Herald Tribune reported on a June 2008 murder
trial in Maharashtra, India where the court found that evidence of the defendant’s brain scan offered
by the prosecutor demonstrated that she had “experiential knowledge” available only to the killer.
See Anand Giridharadas, India’s Use of Brain Scans in Courts Dismays Critics, THE INT’L HERALD
TRIB., Sept. 15, 2008. See also Neuroethics and Law Blog: Brain Based Lie Detector Leads to
Murder Conviction in India (Lawrence Farwell’s Response), http://kolber.typepad.com/ethics_
law_blog/2008/09/brain-based-lie.html#comments (providing a brief description of the differences
between the Brain Electrical Oscillations Signature test admitted in the Indian court and the EEGbased “brain fingerprinting” technique developed by Lawrence Farwell).
27. See Giridharadas, supra note 26.
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the defendant (who was suspected of poisoning her former fiancé),
thirty-two electrodes had been placed on her head while police read her
their account of the murder.28 Despite the fact that the defendant made
no verbal responses during the BEOS test, and without reference to any
specific evidence of the test’s scientific validity, the judge concluded
that the BEOS test results proved that she had “experiential knowledge”
of the crime.29
There are currently two fully operational for-profit fMRI lie
detection businesses performing brain scans in Massachusetts30 and
California.31 Under the circumstances, it is reasonable to assume that
U.S. courts will soon confront similar efforts to introduce cognitive
neuroscience evidence. In the near future, when cognitive neuroscience
evidence is proffered in court, it will be subjected to pre-trial judicial
validity screening (like all other expert evidence) under the relevant state
or federal evidentiary rules and standards.
1. Threshold Validity Determinations
Ideally, threshold questions of scientific validity are addressed first
by the scientists and then by the courts. In the federal courts, and the
more than thirty states that have adopted Daubert32 in whole or in part,33
future admissibility decisions must be based on the scientific validity of
proffered cognitive neuroscience evidence.34 In theory, these judges will
operate the tools of science to make these pretrial admissibility
determinations. These should include the four flexible factors for
assessing scientific validity identified by the Daubert Court: (1)
testability/falsifiability, (2) peer review and publication, (3) error rate,
and (4) general acceptance within the relevant field.35 However,
empirical research and common sense indicate that (in practice) judges
generally avoid independent assessments of testability/falsifiability or
28. Anand Giridharadas, India’s Novel Use of Brain Scans in Court is Debated, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 15, 2008.
29. Id.
30. See Cephos Corp: Arranging for fMRI Testing, www.cephoscorp.com/fmri-schedule.htm.
During the symposium we learned from Dr. Steven J. Laken (President and CEO of Cephos Corp.)
that Cephos currently performs fMRI lie-detection services and charges $4000 per test.
31. See No Lie MRI home page, http://www.noliemri.com/centers/Centers.htm (last visited
Feb. 23, 2009).
32. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., 509 U.S. 579, 592-93 (1993).
33. See Alice B. Lustre, Post-Daubert Standards for Admissibility of Scientific and Other
Expert Evidence in State Courts, 90 A.L.R. 5th 453 (providing a list of states that have adopted
Daubert).
34. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592-93.
35. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593-94 (1993).
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error rates and rely instead on the validity assessments from within the
field often embodied in evidence of general acceptance and peer
reviewed publications.36 Unfortunately, at least for the foreseeable
future, judges forced to assess the validity of neuroimages that purport to
reveal cognition, deception, or social behavior will find that the science
of cognitive neuroscience is far from clear.
Courts will soon discover profound disagreement within the
relevant cognitive neuroscience community on issues great and small.
For example, it was not surprising to learn that symposium participants
and fMRI-based lie detection researchers Steven J. Laken (President and
CEO of Cephos Corp.) and Dr. Daniel Langleben (Department of
Psychiatry, University of Pennsylvania Medical School) dispute the
accuracy of particular neuroimaging studies or that they disagree about
the specific question of whether valid cognitive neuroscience research
requires a 3.0 Telsa MRI machine (an MRI machine of greater magnetic
force). However, it was startling (if commendably honest) to hear Dr.
Langleben, whom many consider the progenitor of fMRI-based liedetection, express significant reservations about two foundational
cognitive neuroscience assumptions: (1) that truth telling never causes
more response in the brain than lying, and (2) that neuroscientists can
accurately distinguish the brain activity correlates of salience from the
brain activity correlates of deception.
Dr. Langleben’s concerns are consistent with questions raised
within the field of neuroscience by self-designated “neurorealists.”37
Professor Moriarty gamely attempted to address some of these concerns
(from the legal perspective) by providing future courts with practical
advice on operating the relevant admissibility standards. However, her
work also highlights the fact that judges will soon confront the difficult

36. Sophia I. Gatowski et al., Asking the Gatekeepers: A National Survey of Judges on
Judging Expert Evidence in a Post-Daubert World, 25 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 433, 445-448 (2001)
(noting that a survey of 400 state court judges revealed profound difficulties understanding and
applying two of the four flexible Daubert factors – falsifiability and error rates – which leads courts
to emphasize the remaining two criteria – general acceptance and peer-review/publication).
37. “Neurorealism” is a term frequently credited to bioethicist Éric Racine of the Institut de
Recherches Cliniques de Montréal in Canada. According to Racine,
Our concept of ‘neuro-realism’ describes how coverage of fMRI investigations can make
a phenomenon uncritically real, objective or effective in the eyes of the public. This
occurs most notably when qualifications about results are not brought to the reader’s
attention. For example, commenting on an fMRI study of fear, one article states, ‘Now
scientists say the feeling is not only real, but they can show what happens in the brain to
cause it.’
Racine, supra note 10 at 160.
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task of assessing scientific validity in this new, complex, and deeply
divided scientific field.
2. Anticipating the Impact of Judicial Familiarity with
Neuroscience and Neuroimaging Technologies
Judges who will control the admissibility and use of cognitive
neuroscience evidence will be hampered by their general lack of
scientific training and experience. Recent efforts to train judges in basic
science, such as Brooklyn Law School’s Science for Judges,38 may
eventually improve judicial decision-making by expanding judges’ basic
scientific knowledge. In the interim, conscientious judges will endeavor
to make accurate and consistent decisions based on ambiguous and
unsettled scientific information. These decisions should (but probably
will not) include some recognition of the possibility that, as Alexander
Pope once warned, “a little learning is a dangerous thing.”39
Many judges will be intimately familiar with MRI scanners and
will likely have based significant personal or family medical treatment
decisions on neuroimaging test results. This experience will inevitably
shape judicial attitudes and preconceptions. The risk is that real judicial
decisions (like all other decisions) are based on a variety of powerful but
unacknowledged influences. For example, Malcolm Gladwell has
postulated that many of our decisions are based on a process of rapid
cognition that he describes as “thinking without thinking.”40 Although
he does not specifically address legal decision-making, there is common
ground between Gladwell’s popular work and research efforts by
behavioral economists and cognitive psychologists who endeavor to
explain how cognitive biases and heuristics influence judicial decisionmaking.41
A comprehensive discussion of the impact of rapid cognition,
biases, or heuristics on decision making is far beyond the scope of this
Article. However, if we start with Professor Cass Sunstein’s definition
of heuristics as “the basic claim is that in answering hard factual
questions, those who lack accurate information use simple rules of
38. Margaret A. Berger, Science for Judges, 12 J. L. & POL’Y 1 (2003).
39. Alexander Pope, AN ESSAY ON CRITICISM (1709).
40. See Malcolm Gladwell, BLINK: THE POWER OF THINKING WITHOUT THINKING (Little,
Brown and Company 2005). Blink is “concerned with . . . the content and origins of those
instantaneous impressions and conclusions that spontaneously arise whenever [people] . . . confront
a complex situation or have to make a decision under conditions of stress.” Id. at 16.
41. See generally Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Heuristics and Biases in the Courts: Ignorance or
Adaptation?, 70 OR. L. REV. 61 (2000) (describing the impact of cognitive biases and heuristics on
decisions by judges and juries).
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thumb,”42 it is easy to envision judges relying on such rules of thumb as
the “availability heuristic” (which explains our tendency to replace more
difficult and more accurate probability assessments with examples that
more readily spring to mind) or the “representativeness heuristic” (which
explains why we tend to make both warranted and unwarranted
assumptions of commonality).
In this context, judges who
unconsciously rely on mental shortcuts (as we all do) are likely to
overestimate the validity of neuroimages that purport to reveal cognition.
This is because judges will mistakenly equate proffered brain scans with
more familiar radiographic images or mistakenly assume that
technologies that are demonstrably valid medical diagnostic tools yield
equally valid conclusions when they are used to map the neural
correlates of cognition..
Cognitive neuroscience evidence will create especially complicated
problems for future courts, because this research involves new
applications of well-established technologies. These specific problems
have been described by bioethicist Eric Racine, who frequently
expresses his concern about the “uncritical way in which an fMRI
investigation can be taken as validation or invalidation of our ordinary
view of the world . . . [and] the belief that fMRI enables us to capture a
‘visual proof’ of brain activity, despite the enormous complexities of
data acquisition and image processing.”43 Similar validity concerns have
been raised by other neurorealists, like Dr. Russell Poldrack of
U.C.L.A., who warns that
[a]s cognitive neuroscientists who use the same brain imaging
technology, we know that it is not possible to definitively determine
whether a person is anxious or feeling connected simply by looking at
activity in a particular brain region. This is so because brain regions
are typically engaged by many mental states . . . .44

In addition to raising general questions about the validity of many
cognitive neuroscience-based conclusions, Dr. Poldrack also addresses
the more specific problem of reversed causal inferences, which occurs
where people see some activity in a brain area and then conclude that
this part of the brain is where X happens. We can show that if I put
you into a state of fear, your amygdala lights up, but that doesn’t mean
42. Cass R. Sunstein, Moral Heuristics and Moral Framing, 88 MINN. L. REV. 1556, 1560
(2004).
43. See Racine, supra note 10.
44. Michael Shermer, The Brain is Not Modular: What fMRI Really Tells Us: Metaphors,
Modules and Brain Scan Pseudoscience, SCI. AM., May 13, 2008, http://www.sciam.com/article.
cfm?id=a-new-phrenology.
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that every time your amygdala lights up you are experiencing fear.
Every brain area lights up under lots of different states. We just don’t
have the data to tell us how selectively active an area is.45

Another specific problem may be the quality of cognitive neuroscience
data analysis.
A very recent article entitled Puzzlingly High
Correlations in fMRI Studies of Emotion, Personality, and Social
Cognition involved a meta-analysis of the empirical findings reported in
fifty-two social neuroscience articles that relied upon fMRI studies.46
Social neuroscience is a sub-field of cognitive neuroscience that seeks to
correlate brain activity and social behavior. Dr. Vul and his research
team explored the analytic methods described in the fifty-two published
studies and found that more than half suffered from significant problems
of distorted data and biased correlation analysis.47 This led Dr. Vul to
“conclude that a disturbingly large, and quite prominent, segment of
social neuroscience research is using seriously defective research
methods and producing a profusion of numbers that should not be
believed.”48 As these few examples reveal, cognitive neuroscience is an
unsettled and controversial new field marked by significant concerns
about the validity of even peer-reviewed and published research. Judges
will need to understand the nature and extent of these debates to ensure
that they do not oversimplify and overvalue conclusions that appear to
be supported by brain imaging studies.
3. The Valid and Reasonable Application Requirement
To be admitted in court, scientific evidence must not only rest on
generally valid principles and methods, but these principles and methods
must have been validly and reasonably applied to the specific facts at
issue. This requirement was added to Federal Rule of Evidence 702 in
December 200049 after Justice Breyer emphasized its importance in
Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael.50 Writing for the Kumho majority,
Justice Breyer noted that, based on the relevant facts in that case,

45. Id.
46. See Vul et al., supra note 12, at 13 (“Thus, in half of the studies we surveyed, the reported
correlation coefficients mean almost nothing, because they are systematically inflated by the biased
analysis.”)
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Fed. R. Evid. 702 (permitting expert testimony when “(1) the testimony is based upon
sufficient facts or data, (2) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods, and (3)
the witness has applied the principles and methods reliably to the facts of the case”).
50. Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 137 (1999).
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[t]he specific issue before the [district] court was not the
reasonableness in general of a tire expert’s use of a visual and tactile
inspection, [but was instead] the reasonableness of using such an
approach . . . to draw a conclusion regarding the particular matter to
which the expert testimony was directly relevant.51

A more colorful and equally persuasive example is Justice
Blackmun’s Daubert werewolf.52 Writing for the Daubert majority,
Justice Blackmun explained that valid moon phase studies should be
admitted to reveal lighting conditions; but that these same studies should
be excluded if they have been proffered to explain the criminal
defendant’s bizarre behavior.53 Thus, in the cognitive neuroscience
context, research designed to reveal deception that is based on the brain
activity of subjects who have been instructed to lie about insignificant
events under highly artificial conditions should be excluded unless and
until there is adequate empirical evidence demonstrating that this
research can reasonably and reliably be applied to the case.
Cognitive neuroscience, like all nascent scientific fields will raise
new and interesting science and law questions. Judges who overestimate
the validity of this evidence because they equate it with diagnostic
medical imaging or mistakenly assume valid application to the facts at
issue invite jurors to rely on cognitive neuroscience evidence that is, as
Don Pardo might say, “not ready for prime time.”54 At the individual
case level, jury reliance on evidence of dubious validity will lead to
inconsistent and illegitimate verdicts. The systemic concerns raised by
legal reliance on this type of evidence are more profound. If cognitive
neuroscience enters our civil and criminal courts prematurely, a legal
imprimatur of validity will inevitably spill over to other cases and to the
world outside the courthouse.

51. Id. at 153-54.
52. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., 509 U.S. 579, 591 (1993).
53. Id. (“The study of the phases of the moon, for example, may provide valid scientific
‘knowledge’ about whether a certain night was dark, and if darkness is a fact in issue, the
knowledge will assist the trier of fact. However (absent creditable grounds supporting such a link),
evidence that the moon was full on a certain night will not assist the trier of fact in determining
whether an individual was unusually likely to have behaved irrationally on that night.”). In earlier
work, I have posited that Kumho Tire Co., 526 U.S. 137, was designed to encourage future courts to
focus more careful attention on the relevance/application question rather than to simply assume that
the general validity of an expert’s field or opinion necessarily implies that the evidence fits the case
at hand. See Joëlle Anne Moreno, Beyond the Polemic Against Junk Science: Navigating the
Oceans that Divide Science and Law With Justice Breyer at the Helm, 81 B.U. L. REV. 1033, 10491055 (2001).
54. Don Pardo is the long time announcer for Saturday Night Live.
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4. The Potential Effects of Legal Reliance on Cognitive
Neuroscience Evidence
Law does not occur in a vacuum. Legal decisions involving
science implicate the legitimacy of both law and science. In fact, as
Justice Breyer has observed, “[t]he importance of scientific accuracy in
the decision of [science-based] cases reaches well beyond the case
itself”55 because
[a] decision wrongly denying compensation in a toxic substance case .
. . can deprive not only the plaintiff of warranted compensation but can
discourage other similarly situated individuals from even trying to
obtain compensation and can encourage the continued use of a
dangerous substance. On the other hand, a decision wrongly granting
compensation, although of immediate benefit to the plaintiff, through
the strong financial disincentives that accompany a finding of tort
liability, can improperly force abandonment of the substance. Thus if
the decision is wrong, it will improperly deprive the public of what can
be far more important benefits -- those surrounding a drug that cures
many while subjecting a few to less serious risk, for example.56

Because, according to Justice Breyer, individual science-based legal
decisions redound to law, science, and society, “[t]he upshot is that we
must search for law that reflects an understanding of the relevant
underlying science.”57 Justice Breyer’s fear that bad legal thinking
about science can yield not only bad law, but bad science has been
realized in controversies that range from the silicone breast implant
litigation of the early 1990s58 to some very recent decisions authorizing
damages for autism-related injuries following plaintiffs’ MMR
vaccines.59 When judges legitimize pseudoscientific ideas by accepting
them into their courtrooms, the repercussions of these decisions
transcend the individual cases. As we know from our experience with

55. Associate Justice Stephen J. Breyer, The Interdependence of Science and Law, 280
SCIENCE 537, 537 (Apr. 24, 1998).
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. For a detailed analysis of the impact of judicial pseudoscience on legitimate science,
regulatory actions, and social expectations in the breast implant context see Marcia Angell, SCIENCE
ON TRIAL: THE CLASH OF MEDICAL EVIDENCE AND THE LAW IN THE BREAST IMPLANT CASE (W.W.
Norton & Co. 1996).
59. See Arthur Allen, Treating Autism as if Vaccines Caused it, Slate 4/1/09 (describing how
parents who mistakenly believe that autism is caused by thimerisol (a now-discontinued MMR
vaccine preservative) subject their children to dangerous and ineffective chelation therapy).
See generally Joëlle Anne Moreno, Toxic Torts, Autism, and Bad Science: Why the Courts May Be
Our Best Defense Against Scientific Relativism, 40 NEW ENGL. L. REV. 409 (2006).
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the forensic sciences, misunderstandings about scientific validity are
compounded when judges mistake repeated admission at trial (general
acceptance in the courts) for general acceptance within the relevant
scientific community.
Within the field, profound validity concerns currently divide
cognitive neuroscientists. Outside the field, premature social and legal
legitimatization of this type of evidence increase the risk that our borders
will be patrolled by MALINTENT–style mind-reading machines and our
courtrooms equipped with light boxes so that jurors can consider
radiologic images when assessing credibility or behavior. Under the
circumstances, it was surprising that so many symposium participants
merely mentioned and then breezed past these concerns. Their goal was
apparent. Most of the commentators were so anxious to explore the
uncharted philosophical, bioethical, jury nullification, substantive
criminal law, and constitutional implications of future mind-reading
technologies that they simply assumed away threshold accuracy
concerns.60
One notable exception was Professor Michael Perlin, who clearly
prefers the “Slow Train”61 to cognitive neuroscience evidence.
Professor Perlin focused his analysis on the potential in-court use of
brain images to support insanity defense arguments. He expressed
significant skepticism about the potential validity of new mind-reading
technologies especially when balanced against the powerful visceral jury
appeal of colorful pictures that appear to reduce the complexity of
psychological phenomena. Given the fact that American juries are
increasingly exposed to physiological explanations for aberrant
behavior, radiologic images (as a component of even routine healthcare),
and cognitive neuroscience information in the mainstream media,
Professor Perlin’s concerns are prescient. Although there is no easy fix,
Professor Perlin suggested that courts should endeavor to resolve
important threshold validity problems (e.g., the effect of various antipsychotic medications routinely given to criminal defendants on brain
60. In addition to the symposium presenters, this list should include scholars like Professor
Michael Pardo, who (in other fora) has addressed the question of whether accurate neuroscienceenhanced interrogation and lie detection will force a reconceptualization of various fundamental
constitutional rights and privileges. See, e.g., Michael S. Pardo, Evidence, Legal Culture, and
Criminal Procedure, 33 AM. J. CRIM. L. 301 (2006) (exploring the possible impact of
neuroscientific evidence on the Fourth Amendment, the Self Incrimination Clause, and Due Process
rights).
61. This is a friendly reference to Professor Perlin’s well-known abiding interest in the words
and music of Bob Dylan. See Nick Paumgarten, Another Side of Bob Dylan, THE NEW YORKER,
Nov.
18,
2002,
available
at
http://www.newyorker.com/archive/2002/11/18/021118
ta_talk_paumgarten.
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functioning) and threshold legal problems (e.g., defendant consent and
access to public funds for the neuroimaging of indigent defendants)
before they begin to allow cognitive neuroscience evidence to alter the
insanity playing field.
C. Extra-Legal Uses of Cognitive Neuroscience
The symposium also presented a balance of perspectives on a
variety of extra-legal uses of future cognitive neuroscience evidence.
These included two different discussions of the investigatory
implications of neuroimaged deception detection from Professor
Christian Halliburton and Dr. Dov Fox and Professor Stacey Tovino’s
exploration of the impact of new neuroscience evidence on health
insurance coverage for a variety of gender-specific health conditions.
Professor Jonathan Marks focused our attention on the
counterterrorism applications of cognitive neuroscience. According to
Professor Marks, who has obtained extensive discovery from the
Department of Defense, the Department recently renewed its
commitment to developing new deception detection technology when it
renamed its “Polygraph Institute” the “Defense Academy for Credibility
Assessment.”62 Professor Marks did not discuss MALINTENT, but
presumably he is anticipating that the Defense Department will develop
and promote a variety of new, sophisticated, well-funded deception
detection technologies. Professor Marks’ specific concerns about the
extralegal implications of new “mind reading” technologies include: (1)
the small number of test subjects that form the basis of existing studies,
(2) the artificiality of cognitive neuroscience testing environments, (3)
the temporal limits of fMRI neuroimaging technology (which may fail to
capture constant changes in brain activity), (4) variations in
neuroanatomy, (5) the fact that deception is a complex situationdependant thought process, and (6) variations in response to test
questions based on cultural expectations and subjective perceptions.
Many of these same concerns should be shared by those who anticipate
the potential in-court applications of cognitive neuroscience evidence.

62. See Department of Defense Directive Number 5210.48 (Jan. 25, 2007) at §1.5 (renaming
the Department of Defense’s Polygraph Institute the Defense Academy for Credibility Assessment),
http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/521048p.pdf.
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II. HOW SHOULD LAW (AND LAW PROFESSORS) RESPOND TO
COGNITIVE NEUROSCIENCE?
In the airport on the way home from Akron, I commented to a
fellow symposium participant that our discussions, which were streamed
live on the internet and would soon be embodied in a series of articles,
could alter the perceived validity of cognitive neuroscience evidence
within the practicing legal community. My specific concern is that
intellectually stimulating explorations of the potential legal value and
future impact of neuroimages that appear to correlate brain activity with
cognition, deception, or social behavior might themselves alter the
playing field by conferring a premature aura of legitimacy to this type of
evidence. This risk is enhanced by the fact that judges and lawyers who
learn about this conference (and other cognitive neuroscience and law
discussions) start with a common belief that the field relies demonstrably
valid imaging technologies. Finally, these concerns are also heightened
by the fact that during this symposium (and the AALS Mid-Year
Conference on Evidence in June 2008) cognitive neuroscience
researchers spoke optimistically about the validity of their work;
although this may be partially attributable to their vested financial
interest in the future profitability of businesses that engage in fMRIenhanced lie detection.63
In other words, when law professors play in the field of science,
should we be bound by the home team rules? It is certainly interesting
and fun to imagine how accurate brain scans revealing deception might
change police interrogations, but if we ignore or underemphasize
genuine validity problems or marginalize neurorealists and other critics
from within the field, are we inadvertently encouraging courts and
practitioners to follow our example? This law professor’s answer was
simple – academics have no responsibility and should have limited
interest in what judges and lawyers do. I appreciated his candor, but my
plane was about to depart so I had little time to consider his position or
respond. With the benefit of time to reflect and a growing sense that his
view is not unique, I have saved the final section of this Article for a
brief response.

63. During three months in mid-2008, I attended two different legal academic conferences
that included presentations on the validity of fMRI-enhanced lie detection from Steven J. Laken,
President and CEO of Cephos Corp., which offers a for-profit lie detection service. See supra note
30 and accompanying text.
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A. Understanding the Value and Limits of Cognitive Neuroscience
It is easy for law professors to recognize that science shapes law,
but harder sometimes to see how law shapes science (or at least shapes
our understanding of scientific developments and controversies). So, at
the risk of apostasy, I will suggest that academic prognosticators should
bear some responsibility for weighing the obvious (and perhaps the less
obvious) social costs of assuming, even for the sake of argument, the
existence of accurate neuroimages of cognition, deception, or social
behavior. This should not be misunderstood as a preference for silence
or a desire to chill interdisciplinary debate. Instead, I offer two modest
guiding principles for future conversations.
First, as we wade into this new field we should be careful not to
omit or obscure the fact that our theoretically interesting explorations of
the philosophical, bioethical, or constitutional ramifications of cognitive
neuroscience evidence are misleading in the short term and useless in the
long term if the field fails to establish through unbiased, independent,
and reliable research that neuroimaging accurately reveals not just the
blood flow in a subject’s brain, but the content of her mind.64 Second,
we should more thoroughly address the potentially problematic
consequences of imminent legal and extralegal reliance on cognitive
neuroscience evidence that is prematurely or inaccurately presumed by
courts (or perhaps the Department of Defense) to be valid, but actually
falls short of any reasonable threshold validity standards.
Academics who acknowledge these risks and shortcomings can find
good company among the neurorealists. But the greatest obstacle to
circumspection is not my ivory-tower ensconced colleague. Instead, it is
our shared human curiosity about the inner workings of the mind
combined with our apparently insatiable desire to distill complex
psychological phenomena into simple explanations that can be easily
illustrated with brightly colored pictures.
B. Brain Research is Sexy
Cognitive neuroscience research (even research of dubious validity)
has the potential to shape legal and extralegal decisions because it is
profoundly interesting and appealing. For example, the “liar, liar, brain
64. I do not mean to suggest that these concerns are entirely ignored. For example, Professor
Greely’s keynote address (and his post-symposium blog report) included a discussion of “the need
to balance talking about the possible implications of speculative technologies with asking always
whether these technologies work or are likely to work.” Hank Greely, University of Akron Law and
Neuroscience Conference, (Oct. 20, 2008) http://lawandbiosciences.wordpress.com/2008
/10/20/university-of-akron-law-and-neuroscience-conference/.
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on fire” possibility was first explored by symposium panelist and
Professor of Psychiatry Daniel Langleben of the University of
Pennsylvania Medical School. Starting in the late 1990s, Professor
Langleben began to use fMRI technology to explore the neural correlates
of deception. Over the past two decades, neuroresearchers around the
world have embarked on similar deception detection studies.65
Other cognitive neuroscience research projects with obvious legal
and social implications (not discussed at the symposium) should include
the recent work of Professor Elizabeth Phelps of New York University.
Professor Phelps has used fMRI scans to assess unconscious racism by
measuring how long it takes test subjects to associate positive adjectives
with black and white faces and comparing this to measurements of
subjects’ amygdala blood flow activity.66 A third example (also not
discussed at the symposium), is new research from Columbia University
Medical Center on the potential impact of repeated exposure to violent
images. These researchers found that fMRI scans of subjects repeatedly
exposed to images of violence revealed diminished activity in the right
lateral orbitofrontal cortex (the brain area purportedly associated with
control over reactive aggressive behavior).67 As you can imagine, these
studies are just the tip of the cognitive neuroscience iceberg.
C. Brain Research is Persuasive
The risk of premature reliance on cognitive neuroscience research
is also enhanced by recent studies demonstrating that research
conclusions that appear to be supported by neuroscience data and/or
brain scans are far more likely to be accepted and believed even when
they are otherwise illogical.
1. Brain Scan Images Enhance Perceived Validity
Neuropsychologists from the University of Colorado recently
studied the impact of brain images on judgments of scientific reasoning.
This study exposed 156 undergraduate participants to fictional news

65. A Medline search run on October 1, 2008 revealed twenty-two research papers describing
studies of neuroimaged lie detection. The first two studies were published by Dr. Langleben
(Department of Psychiatry, University of Pennsylvania Medical School) and Dr. Lee (Department
of Psychology, University of Hong Kong) in March 2002.
66. Jeffrey Rosen, The Brain on the Stand, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 11, 2007.
67. Christopher R. Kelly, et al., Repeated Exposure to Media Violence is Associated with
Diminished Response in an Inhibitory Frontolimbic Network, PLOS ONE, (Dec. 2007), available at
http://www.plosone.org/article/info%3Adoi%2F10.1371%2Fjournal.pone.0001268.
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articles summarizing cognitive neuroscience research.68 Each article
was presented either without images, with an accompanying bar graph,
or with accompanying brain scan images.69 The objective was to
determine whether the bar graph and/or brain scan images enhanced the
persuasive appeal of the research conclusions.
Researchers discovered that whenever neuroscience articles were
accompanied by brain scan images (but not when they were
accompanied by bar graphs), the perceived scientific merit of the article
was significantly increased.70 This change occurred even when the text
of the article was riddled with scientific reasoning errors.71 These
findings led the researchers to conclude that “[b]rain images may be
more persuasive than other representations of brain activity because they
provide a tangible physical explanation for cognitive processes that is
easily interpreted as such.”72
2. Cognitive Neuroscience Explanations (Even Without Brain
Scan Images) Enhance Perceived Validity
A 2008 study published in the Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience
explored the recent and intense public interest in neuroscience
To better understand why
explanations of human behavior.73
neuroscience is so intriguing to the general public, Yale University
neuropsychologists hypothesized that people might “uncritically accept
any explanation containing neuroscience information, even in cases
when the neuroscience information is irrelevant to the logic of the
explanation.”74 In this study, participants were asked to rate the quality
of good and bad explanations of scientific phenomena. Neuroscience
information such as “brain scans indicate” and descriptions of “frontal
lobe brain circuitry” were inserted into both good and bad
explanations.75
Researchers found that when the neuroscience references were
omitted, subjects who ranged from novices, to students (members of an
introduction to cognitive neuroscience class), to experts (individuals
who were pursuing or had completed advanced cognitive neuroscience
degrees) could readily distinguish between the good and bad scientific
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.

McCabe & Castel, supra note 20, at 345.
Id.
Id. at 346.
Id. at 345-46.
Id. at 349.
See Weisberg, supra note 20.
Weisberg, supra note 20, at 470.
Id. at 471.
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explanations.76 However, for novices and students, the introduction of
(even irrelevant) references to brain scans and frontal lobe brain circuitry
caused participants to overestimate the quality of the bad explanations.77
Based on this data, the researchers concluded that “the neuroscience
information provided them with a physical explanation for a behavioral
phenomenon . . . [which] made the bad behavioral explanations seem
connected to a larger explanatory system, and hence more insightful.”78
These recent University of Colorado and Yale University studies
suggest that cognitive neuroscience evidence and brain scan images are
incredibly appealing, even to sophisticated audiences. These findings
have significant implications for our anticipated reliance on cognitive
science research in legal and extralegal contexts. In fact, the Yale study
contains a very explicit warning – cognitive neuroscience evidence
“presented in a courtroom, a classroom, or a political debate, regardless
of the scientific status or relevance of the evidence, could strongly sway
opinion, beyond what the evidence can support.”79
III. CONCLUSION
The question is not whether cognitive neuroscience will change
law, but whether cognitive neuroscience should change law now (or in
the reasonably foreseeable future). More knowledge about how the
brain works and better images of brain activity have obvious social
value. However, as the debates within the field reveal, deciding when
law can derive genuinely valid and useful information from
neuroscience research on cognition/deception will be neither easy nor
obvious. Perhaps Arthur Clarke was right that ultimately “any
sufficiently advanced technology is indistinguishable from magic.”80
One day cognitive neuroscientists might perform the magic of accurate
mind reading. In the interim, law professors, judges, and lawyers should
continue to work with neuroscientists (including neurorealists) to
understand the value and the limits of their research.

76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
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Arthur C. Clarke, PROFILES OF THE FUTURE 36 (Holt, Rinehart, and Winston 1962).
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